



High-Assurance Security/Safety on HPEC Systems: an Oxymoron?


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30-SEP-2004

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
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This presentation represents joint research between the
Air Force, Army, Navy, NSA, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Objective Interface,
Green Hills, LynuxWorks, Wind River, GD, Rockwell Collins, MITRE, U of Idaho





The Whole Point of MILS



Really simple:

- Dramatically **increase the scrutiny** of *security critical code*
- Dramatically **reduce the amount** of *security critical code*



Orange Book vs. MILS Architecture



Monolithic Applications

*User
Mode*

Monolithic Kernel

Network I/O

File systems

Information Flow

Data isolation

Auditing

DAC

MAC

Device drivers


*Privilege
Mode*

*Damage Limitation
Periods Processing*

Kernel



Orange Book vs. MILS Architecture



Middleware



User Mode

Mathematical Verification

Partitioning Kernel

Information Flow Data isolation
Periods Processing Damage Limitation

Privilege Mode


Kernel



Partitioning Communication System



Zero-copy Secure Communications Channel





Partitioning the Channel

